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U.S. HEALTHCARE WORKFORCE 
IMPACT: 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY
• 10% of the U.S. working population employed in healthcare 
settings (~31 million people) (BLS 2008)
• Nearly 37 million patient discharges per year (both living and 
deceased)
– Of patients admitted to US hospitals, at least 185,000 are HIV-positive 
(NCHS 2007)
– 46 per 1000 are colonized or infected with MRSA (Jarvis 2007)
– In 2007, there were 4.5 million cases of HBV and 849,000 cases of 
HCV reported to the CDC in the general population (MMWR 2009)
– Community-associated MRSA (CA-MRSA) infection rate is six-fold 
higher among HIV-positive patients (996 per 100,000 patients) and 
significantly increasing since 2000 (Popovich 2010)
Given that nearly 10% of U.S. workers are 
employed in healthcare and over 10% of the 
U.S. population will be admitted to an acute 
care facility, one-fifth of the U.S. population 
contribute to the potential risk pool of 
occupational exposure to infectious diseases 
spread through blood and body fluids.
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE 
IMPACT: 
PERCUTANEOUS & 
MUCOTANEOUS INCIDENTS
Emerging Risk
Given that patients are living longer with 
bloodborne diseases like HIV, HBV, and HCV 
and given the increasing prevalence of multi-drug 
resistant organisms (MDROs) like MRSA and C. 
difficile and newly emerging viruses like H1N1 
flu, the potential of transmission from patient to 
healthcare worker via splash or splatter may be a 
more important public health concern than 
previously thought 
(Davies 2007)
MSSIs in High Risk Areas
• MSSIs occur more frequently in high risk hospital 
areas such as surgery and emergency 
catheterization laboratories, during dental 
procedures, in orthopedics and obstetrics, and in 
emergency field situations.  
• In these clinical settings, healthcare workers are 
exposed to blood and body fluid at high volume 
and velocity, because procedures involve the use 
of drills, pressurized water and gas, and venous 
and arterial blood. 
Gerberding 1990, Panlilio 1991, Reed 1993, Jagger 1994, Tokars 1995, 
Pietrabissa 1997, Puro 2001, Adesunkanmi 2003, Jagger 1994, Puro 2001
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE 
IMPACT: 
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE 
EQUIPMENT (PPE) USE
Behavioral Drivers of PPE Compliance
Potentially hazardous behaviors are negatively 
affected by:
– Inadequate training; 
– Little understanding of disease transmission;
– Poor comprehension of occupational risk; 
– Unavailability and inappropriate selection of PPE; 
– Selection of uncomfortable or burdensome PPE; 
– High pressure or unexpected situations; and 
– An overall risk-taking personality or complacency 
among healthcare workers.  
Naghavi 2009, Gershon 1995, Krishnan 2006, Matthews 2008, Sacchi 2007 
Perry 2003, Jagger 1994. Maddan 2002, Gershon 1995
Epidemiologic Bad News
• 1995 -- Protective eyewear (goggles, faceshields) are worn in 
5% of reported exposures  in emergency despite common 
sense knowledge of preventive control strategies
• 1998 -- Out of 367 BBF exposures reported through EPINet, 
74% of the cases were not wearing protective equipment such 
as goggles, face shields, or eyeglasses with side shields
• 1999 -- Operating room personnel have poor compliance with 
PPE use: as few as 32% wear glasses and 24% wear no eye 
protection
• 2007 -- Almost half of the splash and splatter incidents in an 
obstetrics setting the worker was not wearing any personal 
protective devices
Jagger 1995, Jagger1998, Akduman 1999, Sacchi 2007 
NATIONAL SURVEILLANCE: 
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO 
BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS
Surveillance Time Line: 1961
• 1961, CDC assumed responsibility for the collection and publication of 
data concerning nationally notifiable diseases as a means of identifying 
when quarantine measures may need to be instituted to prevent the 
introduction and spread of diseases into the United States.  
– Voluntary, state-by-state; collected through a centralized system; the National 
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS).  
– NNDSS cases are collected, analyzed, and published in the Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Reports (MMWR).  
– CDC recommends reporting hepatitis through NNDSS and includes 
information about whether the cause was a percutaneous injury.  
– In NNDSS, there were 73 hepatitis B virus and 21 hepatitis C virus cases 
reported from “percutaneous injury” in 2007
– Limitations - no information in NNDSS related to whether the percutaneous 
injury was occupational, nor what other occupational routes of exposure may 
have occurred (e.g. mucotaneous).  As well, while information is collected 
about hepatitis, it is not collected for HIV.  
(MMWR 2009)
Surveillance Time Line: 1995
• In 1995, the National Surveillance System for Health 
Care Workers (NaSH) was in put into place. 
• In 2007, it was replaced by the Healthcare Personnel 
Safety (HPS) Component of National Healthcare Safety 
Network (NHSN).   
– CDC collects data from a sample of US hospitals in order 
to estimate the magnitude of adverse events among 
healthcare workers by monitoring occupational exposures 
and infections among healthcare workers through its NHSN 
database.  
– HPS/NHSN is voluntary, gathering information on 
occupational exposure to blood and body fluids, vaccine- 
preventable diseases, and tuberculosis as a means to assist 
healthcare facilities, public health agencies, and the CDC to 
monitor and report trends in exposures.  
(www.cdc.gov/nhsn 2009)
• At no time did CDC collect reports of occupational 
exposures to blood and body fluids, only occupational 
seroconversion cases.  
• CDC has investigated 57 confirmed cases of employee 
seroconversion to HIV following occupational 
exposure since 1981
– 48 percutaneous, 
– 5 mucotaneous 
– 2 both percutaneous and mucotaneous, and 
– 2 were unknown
again with the last case having been reported to CDC in 2000 
(CDC 2006).  
• No report has been issued by CDC from its NaSH data 
since 2001 and the last reported new case of 
occupationally-acquired HIV was in 2000.   
Transition from NaSH to NHSN
• Publications from the new NHSN have been limited to 
healthcare associated infections (e.g., bloodstream 
infections, ventilator-associated pneumonia) and other 
patient safety issues, but not occupationally-acquired 
infections related to either bloodborne or contact 
pathogens (CDC 2009).  
• The latest published NHSN data includes aggregate 
data from over 2000 facilities contributing information 
on healthcare associated infections among patients, but 
none among healthcare workers (Edwards 2009) 
Non-Governmental Surveillance: 1991
• One surveillance system instituted outside of the 
Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) and used for global surveillance of 
occupational exposures to blood and body fluids 
is the Exposure Prevention Information Network 
(EPINet™).  
• Developed by Janine Jagger, M.P.H., Ph.D., and 
colleagues in 1991 to provide standardized 
methods for recording and tracking percutaneous 
injuries and blood and body fluid contacts 
(International Healthcare Worker Safety Center 2010)
No Surveillance Must Mean No Risk
• In 2000, the last year that a case of occupational 
HIV was reported to CDC, EPINet identified 
approximately 1,552 contaminated sharps injuries 
and 470 BBF (non-sharps injuries) reported in 
over 40 facilities (EPINet 2000).  
• If there were 2,022 potential occupational 
exposures to BBPs in only 40 hospitals that 
contribute to EPINet, it can be deduced that there 
were 100s of thousands of potential exposures 
when extrapolated out to over 5,000 hospitals 
(AHA 2010) in the US.  
POLICY IMPACT: 
PERCUTANEOUS & 
MUCOTANEOUS INCIDENTS
Focus on Needlesticks: OSHA 1991, 2000
Because of the changing national and clinical practice environment over the 
years, counts and subsequent ratios of blood and body fluids to sharps 
injuries may be changing for several reasons:
(1) In 2001, OSHA incorporated additional requirements in its Bloodborne 
Pathogens Standard which may influence preventive controls put in place 
by hospitals and thus overall sharps exposure incidents
(2) Over time, as hospitals perform risk assessments and evaluate 
exposures, incidents may decrease as better controls are put into place and 
awareness among healthcare workers grows
(3) Over time, trends in healthcare may result in changing exposures for 
example, more surgeries (elective, plastic, cesarean section, etc.) are being 
performed that can potentially result in more exposures, however as 
technology improves more non-invasive or less-invasive procedures and 
diagnostics may reduce potential exposures over time
(OSHA 1991, 2001, Jagger 2008, DeCarli 2009, Jagger 2010, Tossini 2010, Jagger 2010)
To be considered…
whether there is a potential positive impact with 
decreasing sharps injuries due to national focus on 
engineering controls and potentially no impact on 
splashes and splatters because national activity, 
awareness, and policies have remained the same 
or steady over time. These changes may be seen 
differently in different hospital areas based on 
risk, uptake of new protective technologies, 
increased awareness, changes in procedures, or 
other impacts. 
SHHHH…
Stay Tuned for New Research
• The ratio of reports of MSSIs to PCSIs is 
changing over the time period 1995 to 2007.
• The ratio of reports of MSSIs to PCSIs is higher 
in high risk hospital areas than those in low risk 
hospital areas.
• Healthcare workers who experience an MSSI 
wear personal protective equipment more 
frequently in high risk hospital areas than those in 
low risk hospital areas.
BBF and SOI Reports 1995 - 2007
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Thank you!
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